Abstract. We evaluate the temporal stability of risk preferences using a remarkable data set that combines socio-demographic information from the Danish Civil Registry with information on risk attitudes from a longitudinal field experiment. Our econometric model accounts for endogenous sample selection and attrition processes that may confound inferences about temporal stability. Our experimental design builds in randomization on the incentives for participation that facilitates empirical identification of the model. In general, we find evidence consistent with temporal stability after correcting for the effects of selection and attrition. When neglected, these effects change our inferences in an economically and statistically significant manner.
Introduction
Any longitudinal survey or experimental design raises concerns about sample selection and attrition, and response rates may vary dramatically depending on the nature of the study and incentives provided in the design. Controlling for endogenous effects of sample selection requires some background information on subjects who did not select into the survey or experiment, so that one can estimate a latent selection process and its correlation with the primary outcome of interest. This information is often missing, and most longitudinal studies are concerned just with attrition effects. For non-participants, attrition outcomes are also missing, and strictly speaking one cannot control for attrition effects without addressing endogenous selection first. Without controlling for selection effects, the estimates of a latent attrition process may be subject to selection bias even when there is no effect of selection on the primary outcome in the initial wave of the study.
Using a structural model of risky choices which allows for endogenous sample selection and panel attrition, we analyze data from a longitudinal field experiment with a stratified sample of the adult Danish population. The data are linked to administrative data from the Civil Registry in Denmark, allowing us to observe background information on non-participants. We illustrate the importance of controlling for within-wave and between-wave effects of sample selection in the evaluation of individual risk attitudes at different points in time.
Temporal stability of risk preferences is a common assumption in evaluations of economic behavior.
1 When the potential benefits of any social insurance policy are evaluated, for example, one must extreme cases of completely unrelated and completely stable preferences. Of course, under RDU risk preferences are also characterized by the probability weighting function. We find more evidence on the stability of the probability weighting function than for the utility function, both at the population and individual levels. Overall, we find evidence consistent with temporal stability under EUT and RDU at the aggregate population level.
Our use of exogenously varied recruitment fees demonstrates how one can constructively design features of a survey or experiment to facilitate empirical identification of sample selection effects. Building on Heckman [1976 Heckman [ ][1979 , the emphasis in the literature has been on the discovery of some "exclusion restrictions," referring to variables that affect the probability of selection but do not affect the primary outcome of interest. 7 The collection of these variables could be designed by the surveyor or experimenter, but often were not. 8 In most cases analysts simply have to live with the existing set of variables in a survey or experiment, and search for exclusion restrictions on an a priori basis. The later theoretical literature, typified by Das, Newey and Vella [2003] , stresses the value of direct controls over the probability of selection, rather than relying on some variables selected on an a priori basis.
comparison because it is often made to assuage concerns about sample selection: check if the final sample is similar to the population for a few observed characteristics, and then assume it is representative in all characteristics, including those that are latent and unobserved. In the absence of the type of data we have access to in Denmark, this may appear to be a reasonable "second best" procedure, but our results show that it may be an inadequate check on endogenous sample selection effects.
The initial recruitment letter for the experiment explained the purpose and that it was being conducted by Copenhagen Business School. The letter clearly identified that there would be fixed and stochastic earnings from participating in the survey. In translation, the uncertainty was explained as follows:
You can win a significant amount To cover travel costs, you will receive 500 kroner at the end of the meeting. Moreover, each participant will have a 10 percent chance of receiving an amount between 50 and 4,500 kroner in one part of the survey. In another part of the survey, each participant will have a 10 percent chance of receiving at least 1,500 kroner. Some of these amounts will also be paid out at the end of the meeting, and some amounts will be paid out in the future. A random choice will decide who wins the money in the different parts of the survey.
The fixed amount is 500 kroner in the treatment that this text comes from, and 300 kroner in another treatment. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of these two recruitment treatments. The stochastic earnings referred to in the recruitment letter were for a risk aversion task and separate tasks eliciting time preferences. 12 Thus the subjects should have anticipated the use of randomization in the experiment.
subjects, to facilitate a broad mix of attendance. The largest session had 15 subjects, but most had fewer.
The procedures were standard: Appendix A documents an English translation of the instructions, and shows a typical screen display for the risk aversion task. Subjects were given written instructions which were read out and then made choices in a trainer task for small non-monetary rewards. The trainer task was "played out" and illustrated the procedures in the experiment. All decisions were made on computers.
After all choices had been made the subject was asked a series of standard socio-demographic questions.
There were 40 risk attitude choices and 40 discounting choices, and each subject had a 10% chance of being paid for one choice in each block of 40 choices. 14 The risk attitude choices preceded the discounting choices in one treatment, and vice versa in another treatment. Average payments for the risk attitude choices were 242 kroner, and average payments for the discounting choices were 201 kroner (although some were for deferred receipt), for a combined average of 443 kroner. The exchange rate at the time was close to 5 kroner per U.S. dollar, so expected earnings from these tasks combined were $91.
The subjects were also paid a 300 kroner or 500 kroner fixed show-up fee, plus earnings from subsequent tasks.
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To derive distances, we downloaded geographical coordinates of relevant locations from Google Maps and applied software due to Picard [2010] that measures the length of the shortest curve between two locations over an estimated surface of the earth.
14 The number of subjects in each session varied between 3 and 15, which is independent of the Between April 2010 and October 2010 we repeated the risk aversion and discounting tasks with 182 of the 413 subjects who participated in the first experiment. 16 Each subject was interviewed in private in the new experiment, and the meeting was conducted at a convenient location for them (e.g., their
private residence or the hotel where the first experiment took place). All subjects were paid a fixed fee of 300 kroner for their participation in the second experiment.
17 Table 1 provides the sample response in each panel wave, and definitions of the explanatory variables used in the statistical analysis and summary statistics. We observe a significant difference in sample response with the high recruitment fee compared to the low recruitment fee. The drop from 24.1% to 18.1% in the first wave is statistically significant according to a Fisher Exact test, with a p-value less than 0.001. After participating in the first wave, the sample response to recruitment into the second wave was slightly lower for those recruited into the first wave with the high recruitment fee compared to in the analysis as if they were 300 kroner subjects, since that was the incentive in the original invitation.
Treating them as 500 kroner subjects does not change the results. 16 There were four steps in the construction of this sub-sample. First, we divided the country into five regions, and each region was divided into sub-regions. Each sub-region was assigned 1 or 2 numbers, in rough proportionality to the population of the sub-region. In total we assigned 24 numbers. Second, although Denmark is a relatively small country, it was necessary to consider logistical constraints, and we randomly picked 12 of the 24 numbers for the experiment in April 2010 and the remaining 12 numbers for the experiment in October 2010. Third, we picked the first 50% of the randomly sorted records within each sub-region. This provided a sub-sample of 100 subjects for each experiment. Fourth, we contacted subjects by phone and invited them to participate again in the experiments. 17 We did not vary the recruitment fee in the second experiment because we offered to interview the subjects at home or the hotel where the first experiment was conducted. The experiments were time consuming and expensive to conduct, and we paid subjects the low recruitment fee of 300 kroner in the second experiments to keep costs down. We certainly see value from varying recruitment fees in the second stage as well.
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B. Experiments to Infer Risk Attitudes
Risk attitudes were evaluated from data in which subjects made a series of binary lottery choices.
For example, lottery A might give the individual a 50-50 chance of receiving 1600 kroner or 2000 kroner to be paid today, and lottery B might have a 50-50 chance of receiving 3850 kroner or 100 kroner today.
The subject picks A or B. We used the procedures of Hey and Orme [1994] , and presented each binary choice to the subject as a "pie chart" showing prizes and probabilities. 18 We gave each subject the same set of 40 choices, in four sets of 10 choices with the same prizes. with the probabilities varying within each set of 10 choices. 19 We refer to the first and last of these four prize sets as the "high stakes" lotteries compared to the "low stakes lotteries" in the second and third set.
These four treatments with different prize sets were administered within subjects. 18 The use of "pie charts" is common in experimental elicitation of risk preferences, but should not be viewed as the only way that one might present lottery choices. Arguably, probabilities appear more salient than prizes in a pie chart, since probabilities are displayed both graphically (as pie slices) and numerically, whereas prizes are only displayed numerically. Harrison and Rutström [2008; Appendix A] review alternative ways of presenting lotteries in the literature, none of which has emerged as obviously superior for all purposes.
19 Within each prize set the 10 choices were presented one at a time in an ordered manner, with the probability of the high prize starting at 0.1 and increasing by 0.1 until the last choice is between two certain amounts of money.
-11- We asked each subject to respond to all 40 risk aversion tasks and then randomly decided which one to play out using numbered dice. The large incentives and budget constraints precluded us from paying all subjects, so each subject was given a 10% chance to actually receive the payment associated with his decision. The typical findings from lottery choice experiments of this kind are that individuals are generally averse to risk, and that there is considerable heterogeneity in risk attitudes across subjects: see Harrison and Rutström [2008] for an extensive review.
Identification of Risk Preferences
We first write out a structural model to estimate risk attitudes assuming EUT, to focus on essentials. We then discuss how the likelihood function changes to account for sample selection and attrition, and then finally discuss the extension from EUT to the more general RDU model.
A. Baseline EUT Specification
Consider the estimation of risk preferences in the simplest possible model of decision-making under risk, EUT, without worrying about sample selection or attrition. In our experiment, each decision task presented a choice between two lotteries, and each lottery had two potential outcomes. Let M ij be the j th outcome of lottery i, where i=A,B and j=1,2. Assume that the utility of an outcome is given by the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification
for r1, where r is the CRRA coefficient. Then, under EUT, r=0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r>0 denotes risk aversion, and r<0 denotes risk loving behavior.
EUT predicts that the observed choice is lottery B when it gives the larger expected utility (EU) than lottery A and vice versa. Probabilities for each outcome, p(M ij ), are those that are induced by the experimenter, so the EU of lottery i is simply the probability weighted average of its outcome utilities, -12- 
, where õ is a positive scale factor that we will parameterize shortly. Assume further that g is normally distributed with the standard deviation of ì, g ~ N(0, ì 2 ). The choice probability of lottery B is then Ö(LEU) where Ö(.) is the standard normal cumulative density function (CDF), and the index LEU is given by
It follows that the likelihood function for each choice observation takes the form
As the noise parameter ì approaches 0, this stochastic EUT specification collapses to the deterministic EUT model; conversely, as ì gets arbitrarily large, it converges to an uninformative model which predicts a 50:50 chance regardless of the underlying EU difference.
We complete the behavioral error specification by adopting the contextual utility model of Wilcox [2011] : õ is set to (U max -U min ), where U max and U min are the maximum and minimum of the four potential outcome utilities, U(M A1 ), U(M A2 ), U(M B1 ) and U(M B2 ). Supposing that lottery B is riskier than lottery A, it is arguably desirable to have a statistical model that predicts a smaller probability of choosing B for a more risk averse person with a larger r. The traditional Fechner error model (õ = 1) leads to choice probabilities that do not vary monotonically with r in this manner, an issue identified by Wilcox [2011] and reiterated by Apesteguia and Ballester [2018] . 20 The contextual utility model addresses this potential drawback.
To clarify our econometric methods, more notation is needed than one would typically see in the context of non-linear models for panel data. We subscript the choice-level likelihood function in (4) as P ntw (r nw , ì) henceforth, to emphasize that it describes subject n's choice in decision task t of panel wave w. 21 The CRRA coefficient r nw is indexed by subject n and wave w for two reasons. First, to capture 20 In Appendix F, we re-estimate our main models assuming the Fechner error specification. 21 We repeated the same set of experiments across two panel waves, and within each wave the -13- from it, to vary freely across waves. We use f(r n1 , r n2 ; è) to denote the joint density function for the random CRRA coefficients, where è is a set of parameters that characterize their joint distribution.
It is possible to estimate the set of parameters è directly and draw inferences about the population distribution of risk preferences, once the joint density f(r n1 , r n2 ; è) is fully specified. Assume that r n1 and r n2
are jointly normal so that è = (2 r 1, 2 r 2 , ó r1 , ó r2, ó r1r2 ), where 2 r w and ó rw are the population mean and standard deviation of the CRRA coefficient r nw , and ó r1r2 is the covariance between r n1 and r n2. Conditional on a particular pair of CRRA coefficient draws, the likelihood of observing a series of 40 or 80 choices made by subject n can be specified as CL n (r n1 , r n2 , ì) = ( t P nt1 (r n1 , ì) if s n2 = 0 (5) = ( t P nt1 (r n1 , ì) × ( t P nt2 (r n2 , ì) if s n2 = 1 where s n2 is an indicator of whether subject n participated in only the first panel wave (s n2 = 0) or both panel waves (s n2 = 1). Since r n1 and r n2 are modeled as random coefficients, the "unconditional" (Train [2009, p.146] ) or actual likelihood of subject n's choices is then obtained by taking the expected value of CL n (r n1 , r n2 , ì) over the joint density f(r n1 , r n2 ; è) L n (2 r 1, 2 r 2 , ó r1 , ó r2, ó r1r2 , ì) = L n (è, ì) = **CL n (r n1 , r n2 , ì)f(r n1 , r n2 ; è)dr n1 dr n2.
Unobserved heterogeneity is similarly integrated out from many textbook models for panel data, such as random effects probit (Wooldridge [2010, p.613] ). 22 Our application is distinctive because unobserved subject completed a series of decision tasks over 40 lottery pairs. The outcomes and probabilities associated with lottery pairs vary from task to task, and the same subject may make different choices across tasks and waves. Each lottery outcome and its probability are then M ijntw and p(M ijntw ), leading to the expected utilities EU intw and the index function LEU ntw . The indicator y ntw is 1 (0) if subject n chooses lottery B (lottery A) in decision task t of the experiment in wave w.
22 Much as one finds with a random effect probit model, our random coefficient model allows for panel correlation across repeated observations on the same individual. Although (5) is a product formula -14-
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology heterogeneity enters the index function LEU ntw non-linearly via the CRRA coefficient, and varies across two wave-specific blocks of observations instead of being time-invariant. 23 The unconditional likelihood function L n (è, ì) does not have a closed-form expression, but can be approximated using simulation methods (Train [2009, p.144-145] ). We compute maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimates of risk preference parameters è and the behavioral noise parameter ì by maximizing a simulated analogue to the sample log-likelihood function ' n ln(L n (è, ì)). The estimation sample is 413 subjects who participated in the first experiment or both experiments.
Our modeling framework offers several ways to define and analyze temporal stability of risk attitudes. One can test if the entire population distribution of risk preferences is stable, which can be expressed as a joint hypothesis H 0 : 2 r 1 = 2 r 2 and ó r1 = ó r2 . Alternatively, one can test the temporal stability of the average person's risk attitude (H 0 : 2 r 1 = 2 r 2 ), or test the temporal stability of unobserved preference heterogeneity (H 0 : ó r1 = ó r2 ). We can also accommodate observed heterogeneity by writing 2 r 1 and 2 r 2 as linear functions of the subject's characteristics, such as age, gender and income. 24 It is then possible to consider the question of which demographic groups tend to be more risk averse, and examine if the answer to that question is temporally stable.
The questions so far pertain to temporal stability at the population level, but the analysis can focus on temporal stability at the individual level as well. By normalizing the scale of covariance ó r1r2 , one can derive a coefficient ñ r1r2 = ó r1r2 / (ó r1 × ó r2 ) that directly measures the within-individual correlation of the CRRA coefficient over time. Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008b] elicit risk preferences using akin to the pooled probit model, it is only one building block for the actual likelihood function in (6) that integrates such formulas. The log of this likelihood function does not simplify into a sum of observationlevel log-likelihood functions, so our statistical approach does not rely on the independence of choice observations within individuals.
23 Methods for estimating non-linear random coefficients models of risk aversion were developed by Andersen, Harrison, Hole, Lau and Rutström [2012] . 24 For illustration, we analyze a model of male-female differences in risk attitudes in Appendix E.
-15-
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology multiple price list formats, and compute this type of correlation based on the midpoints of CRRA intervals that predict observed behavior under EUT. The approach we take here is far more general because it allows for behavioral errors and can be applied with any elicitation format, as long as the statistical model incorporates a random coefficient specification similar to ours. Moreover, as reported below, one can estimate the within-individual correlations of structural parameters in an analogous manner after correcting for selection and attrition biases, as well as in the context of RDU models.
B. EUT Specification with Endogenous Sample Selection and Panel Attrition
The experimental design allows us to correct for sample selection into both panel waves of the experiment. 25 Estimates of risk aversion could be sensitive to the sample selection and attrition process in any longitudinal setting, and the estimated coefficients in the behavioral model may be significantly biased if subjects condition their participation on unobservable characteristics that correlate with their latent risk preferences. It is not obvious a priori that individuals with stable preferences are more likely to self-select into the early or later stages of our experiment. Since the decision to participate in the experiment may be correlated with individual risk preferences, it is appropriate to account for possible sample selection and attrition effects in the statistical model.
To control for sample selection bias, we take the initial pool of 1,996 invited subjects as a random sample from the population, and model the initial selection process that lead to 413 subjects in the first experiment. From this sample, 354 subjects were invited to the second experiment. To control for panel attrition bias, we take those 354 subjects as a random sample from the sub-population that self-selected into the first experiment, and model the attrition process that led to 182 subjects in the second experiment. This general strategy is consistent with our experimental design, under which the experimenter exogenously determines whether someone is invited to the first experiment, and which subjects in the first experiment get invited to the second experiment.
25 Vella [1998] surveys alternative specifications for modelling sample selection, including semiparametric methods.
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We first describe a system of binary response models that describes sample selection and attrition.
Let s nw be an indicator of whether subject n accepted the invitation to the experiment in wave w (s nw = 1) or not (s nw = 0). For those who were not invited to the second experiment, we set s n2 = -1. Assume that each observed outcome s nw is determined by a latent propensity S nw , such that s n1 = I[S n1 > 0], and s n2 = I[S n1 > 0 1 S n2 > 0] if subject n was invited to the second experiment. The latent propensities are specified as S n1 = X n1 â 1 + u n1 = X n1 â 1 + (a n1 + e n1 ) (7) S n2 = X n2 â 2 + u n2 = X n2 â 2 + (a n2 + e n2 )
where X nw is a vector of explanatory variables including a constant, â w is a conformable vector of coefficients to estimate, and u nw is a random disturbance. We decompose u nw further into a nw and e nw , which are orthogonal to each other. The term a nw captures unobserved characteristics which are potentially correlated with risk attitudes, and across selection and attrition processes. In contrast, e nw captures purely idiosyncratic errors.
Assume that the correlated components a n1 and a n2 are bivariate normal, and that each idiosyncratic error e nw is independently normal. Under this assumption, the composite errors u n1 and u n2
are also bivariate normal. When viewed in isolation from the random coefficient EUT model, the system of equations (7) and (8) is analogous to the probit model with sample selection ( Van de Ven and Van Praag [1981] ) which views the sample retention indicator s n2 as the primary outcome of interest. It is common to normalize this type of model by setting Var(u n1 ) = Var(u n2 ) = 1, and identify â 1 , â 2 and ñ s1s2 = Corr(u n1 , u n2 ) = Cov(a n1 , a n2 ). We could follow the same convention, but prefer to normalize the system by setting Var(u n1 ) = 2 and Var(u n2 ) = 2 + Cov(a n1 , a n2 ), and identify â 1 , â 2 and ó s1s2 = Cov(u n1 , u n2 ) = Cov(a n1 , a n2 ). This scheme allows us to assume Var(a n1 ) = Var(e n1 ) = Var(e n2 ) = 1 and Var(a n2 ) = 1 + ó s1s2 without loss of generality; then, (7) and (8) can more easily be combined with the random coefficient EUT model by attaching probit probabilities to (5), as shown below.
Let g(a n1 , a n2 , r n1 , r n2 ; È) denote a density function for the joint distribution of risk attitudes and relevant selection/attrition errors, which is characterized by parameters in È. Let ó s1rw and ó s2rw denote
Cov(a n1 , r nw ) and Cov(a n2 , r nw ) respectively. We allow for the full set of correlations amongst the four -17- where è = (2 r 1, 2 r 2 , ó r1 , ó r1, ó r1r2 ) characterizes the population distribution of the CRRA coefficients and G = (ó s1s2 , ó s1r1, ó s1r2 , ó s2r1 , ó s2r2 ) collects covariance parameters that may induce selection and attrition biases. For example, a positive ó s1r1 means that those with relatively large CRRA coefficients in wave 1 are more likely to participate in the first experiment, and a positive ó s2r1 means that such subjects with high CRRA coefficients in wave 1 are also more likely to participate in the second experiment. Without correction for selection and attrition, one would overestimate the initial degree of risk aversion in the population. While ó s1s2 does not address risk attitudes directly, this parameter corrects the attrition process for initial selection bias, since the attrition outcomes are only observed for the self-selected sample of participants in the first experiment. If ó s1s2 is falsely constrained to 0, the resulting correction for attrition bias becomes invalid.
We now turn to a likelihood function which augments the baseline EUT specification with controls for selection and attrition biases. Conditional on a particular set of a n1 , a n2 , r n1 and r n2 , the joint likelihood of subject n's selection/attrition outcomes and risky choices can be specified as CL n (a n1 , a n2 , r n1 , r n2 ,
where ô nw = X nw â w + a nw , Ö(.) is the standard normal CDF and P ntw (.) is the choice-level likelihood under the baseline EUT model. The exact form of the conditional likelihood function thus varies for those who rejected the first invitation (s n1 = 0), those who participated in the first experiment but did not receive the second invitation (s n1 = 1, s n2 = -1), those who participated in the first experiment but rejected the second invitation (s n1 = 1, s n2 = 0), and finally those who participated in both experiments (s n1 = s n2 = 1). The unconditional likelihood function for subject n can be obtained by taking the expected value of CL n (a n1 , a n2 , r n1 , r n2 , â 1 , â 2 , ì) over the joint distribution of the four random components L n (È, â 1 , â 2 , ì) = ****CL n (a n1 , a n2 , r n1 , r n2 , â 1 , â 2 , ì)g(a n1 , a n2 , r n1 , r n2 ; È)da n1 da n2 dr n1 dr n2.
(10)
where È = (2 r 1, 2 r 2 , ó r1 , ó r2, ó r1r2 , ó s1s2 , ó s1r1, ó s1r2 , ó s2r1 , ó s2r2 ) in full. Since (10) does not have a closed form expression, we compute the MSL estimates of È, â 1 , â 2 , and ì by maximizing a simulated analogue to the -18- 
The estimation sample is all 1,996 subjects who were invited to the first experiment.
Parametric models with selection and attrition such as ours are theoretically identified without the aid of cross-equation exclusion restrictions. Nevertheless, our experimental design provides natural candidates for such restrictions that we use to assist empirical identification. The initial invitation letter randomized subjects to different recruitment fees, and the longitudinal design allows us to observe each subject's additional earnings from the first experiment. 26 Before coming to the first experiment, subjects did not know anything about the 40 lottery pairs used and, during the first experiment, everyone faced the same set of 40 lottery pairs. We assume that the recruitment fees affect the initial decision to accept the first invitation, but do not affect the decision to accept the second invitation once we control for additional earnings from the first experiment. 27 We maintain the usual hypothesis that the recruitment fees and prior earnings do not affect the subject's evaluation of lottery pairs directly. Finally, subjects had to travel to hotel meeting rooms to participate in the first experiment, whereas each subject chose their own preferred venue for the second experiment.
26 Since the recruitment fee is an observed characteristic and the model is theoretically identified without utilizing this as an exclusion restriction, it is possible to test whether the use of different recruitment fees results in recruitment of subjects with systematically different risk attitudes. For instance, as shown in Table C5 and Table C6 of Appendix C, we can condition the mean of each structural parameter (r n1 and r n2 under EUT, and r n1 , r n2 , ö n1 , and ö n2 under RDU that we will describe shortly) on the recruitment fee indicator and study whether the estimated coefficient on that indicator is significant. The results support our intended use of the recruitment fee as an exclusion restriction to assist empirical 27 Additional earnings in the first experiment include payments for choices in three sets of decision tasks which elicit individual risk attitudes, discount rates and correlation aversion, respectively.
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The preceding discussion motivates us to include the recruitment fees only in X n1 for the selection equation, the actual earnings from the first experiment only in X n2 for the attrition equation, and the lottery payoffs and probabilities only in LEU njt for the structural model of risky choices. In addition, we augment X n1 with each subject's home-to-hotel distance (in miles) and its square. 28 Both X n1 and X n2 also include the subject's age and gender, and X n2 additionally includes self-reported income that is only available for those who participated in the first experiment.
To see the flexibility of our extended specification, one may compare it with several special cases.
Consider first a "naïve" approach, in which each panel wave is evaluated separately, using (7) to correct for selection into the first wave and (8) to correct for selection into the second wave. This approach is naïve in the sense that it fails to recognize the longitudinal nature of the experiments, and requires ó s1s2 = ó s1r2 = ó s2r1 = 0. However, even when these restrictions are valid, the approach cannot identify ó r1r2 and hence ñ r1r2 that measures the temporal stability of risk preferences within individuals. Two special cases arise if both waves are analyzed jointly, but they correct for only selection bias or attrition bias. With correction for selection bias only, one can estimate all structural parameters consistently when ó s2r1 = ó s2r2 = 0. The other special case ignores selection bias and requires ó s1s2 = ó s1r1 = ó s1r2 = 0. The latter case is perhaps more interesting, considering that it resembles what one would do in typical longitudinal studies that observe no information on those who did not participate in the first wave.
Our modeling strategy provides a general framework for the structural estimation of risk preferences with correction for endogenous selection and attrition. While we parameterize the statistical model using multivariate normal densities and probit kernels, with a few notational changes the likelihood 28 How closely the home-to-hotel distance approximates the actual inconvenience involved in
travelling is an open question. The validity of our statistical corrections for endogenous selection and attrition does not rely on any precise interpretation that one might place on the distance variable. As usual, the selection equation in our framework is a reduced-form index model and its coefficients need not have any causal interpretation.
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functions above can incorporate other joint distributions of {a n1 , a n2 , r n1 , r n2 } and kernel CDFs. We focus on the multivariate normal-probit kernel specification primarily to reach a wider audience; the workhorse sample selection models in the empirical literature assume either the bivariate normality of selection and structural errors in a maximum likelihood framework, or the marginal normality of selection errors in
Heckman's two-step procedure. In many longitudinal studies, the researcher may apply correction for panel attrition but not for initial selection due to the lack of information on non-participants. Our econometric approach can be adapted to such settings to specify a structural model with endogenous attrition, by omitting the selection equation and re-normalizing the standard deviation of the attrition error. 29 As usual, the resulting correction for attrition bias would be a second-best solution that presumes the absence of selection bias.
C. Rank Dependent Utility Theory Specifications
RDU is a popular generalization of EUT, due to Quiggin [1982] , that allows the decision-maker to transform the objective probabilities presented in lotteries and use these weighted probabilities to determine decision weights when evaluating lotteries. If w(p) is the probability weighting function assumed, and each lottery has only two prizes such that M i1 > M i2 , then we have
where RDEU i refers to rank dependent expected utility of lottery i, and the remaining notation is as defined in the context of (2).
The logic behind our econometric specifications extends naturally to RDU, once we replace EU i with RDEU i . Of course, one has to specify the functional form for w(p) and estimate additional 29 The conditional likelihood function under this endogenous attrition model is algebraically equivalent to the special case of (9) that assumes s n1 = 1 and Ö(ô n1 ) = 1 for every n. Since the covariance between the selection and attrition errors is no longer identified, the scale of the attrition error should be re-normalized, for example by setting Var(u n2 ) = 2.
-21- 
and is defined for 0<p<1, ç>0 and ö>0. We use its one-parameter special case that assumes ç = 1, and model ö as a log-normally distributed random coefficient ö nw that varies across individuals and panel waves. The resulting one-parameter function exhibits inverse-S probability weighting (optimism for small p, and pessimism for large p) for ö < 1, S-shaped probability weighting (pessimism for small p, and optimism for large p) for ö > 1, and linear probability weighting that reduces RDU to EUT when ö = 1. It rules out the cases of globally concave (optimism for all p) or globally convex (pessimism for all p)
probability weighting a priori, and also implies that the fixed point where w(p) = p occurs at p = 0.368 for any value of ö. The two-parameter function can admit concave and convex cases, and also inverse-S or Sshaped probability weighting with other fixed points. But allowing for the unrestricted joint distribution of random coefficients and selection/attrition errors leads to several extra parameters, making the use of the two-parameter function less practical for our purposes.
One implication of the RDU model is that risk preferences are characterized by more than the concavity of the utility function. The risk premium is a complex function of all of the parameters that define the utility function as well as the probability weighting function. Indeed, a concave utility function might be mitigated by probability "optimism" such that the net effect is risk neutrality or even risk loving. We simply have to examine all parameters to characterize risk preferences in the case of RDU: r and ö.
30 30 The EUT model retains some descriptive value, however. The EUT and RDU models assume the same overall risk premium, even if they explain it differently. It is sometimes useful to focus on the parameter r in the EUT model as a summary statistic on the overall risk premium, even if the RDU model may provide the correct structural decomposition into aversion to outcome variability (the r parameter) and probability weighting (the n parameter).
-22- conditioning the noise parameter on binary variables for each treatment in the experimental design; one variable captures the order of risk aversion and discounting tasks, and the other variable captures our use of high and low stakes in the risk aversion tasks. We also condition the population mean coefficients of latent risk preference parameters on these two treatment variables.
We transform several estimates into alternative forms that are easier to interpret, and report correlation coefficients instead of covariance parameters. For the log-normal random coefficient ö in the RDU model, all results are for ö itself instead of ln(ö). 31 Finally, we divide selection and attrition equation 31 Specifically, we report the mean and median of ö for the base group (constant), along with the marginal effect of each observed characteristic on the mean and median of ö for the base group. The standard deviation of ö is evaluated at the sample average characteristics. The within-individual correlation -23-00845 9
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coefficients by the normalized standard deviation of each equation so that they can be interpreted in the same manner as familiar probit coefficients.
A. Temporal Stability of Risk Attitudes
We find evidence of temporal stability for inferred risk attitudes under EUT when the model fully corrects for endogenous sample selection and attrition bias. Table C1 of Appendix C contains detailed estimates. Single hypothesis tests show that the mean CRRA parameter 2 r w for each treatment group is the same over time. For example, the estimated mean coefficient of relative risk aversion for the baseline case of our econometric model (when RAfirst = RAhigh = 0) is equal to 0.413 in wave 1, and equal to 0.594 in wave 2; the estimated difference in the two mean population coefficients is equal to 0.180, which is not significantly different from 0 with a p-value of 0.236. 32 The estimated population mean coefficient is also larger in wave 2 relative to wave 1 when we control for the high stakes treatment; the estimated difference between the two coefficients is 0.151, which is insignificant with a p-value of 0.294. We also find that the estimated population standard deviation of relative risk aversion is temporally stable; the estimated of ö is computed by applying the usual formula for the correlation coefficient of bivariate log-normal random variables. Other correlations involving ö present cases where we compute the correlation between a log-normal random variable and a normal random variable. Garvey, Book and Covert [2015, p. 443, Theorem B .1] provide a closed-form formula that can be applied to these cases. 32 Our risk aversion experiment was part of a larger experiment that involved a discounting choice tasks and a correlation aversion task. The order of risk aversion and discounting tasks was randomized on a between-subject basis; half of the subjects faced risk aversion tasks first (RAfirst = 1) and the remaining half faced discounting tasks first (RAfirst = 0). The correlation aversion task always followed the risk and discounting tasks. In each wave, each subject completed 20 risk aversion tasks that we classify as low stake (RAhigh = 0) and 20 decision tasks that we classify as high stake (RAhigh = 1). Our model allows for systematic variations in risk preferences across the order and stake treatments. To avoid potential clutter, our figures focus on comparisons across the stake treatments, since the order treatment effect is not statistically significant at the 5% level in any of our estimation results.
-24- has a p-value of 0.480, so we cannot reject the hypothesis of temporal stability. 33 Although the estimated population mean is higher in wave 2 compared to wave 1 for low and high stakes treatments, we find statistical evidence of temporal stability for the entire population distribution of relative risk aversion.
The upper panel in Figure 1 shows the estimated population distributions of relative risk aversion across the two waves and two monetary treatments, with controls for non-random selection and attrition bias. The population distributions of relative risk aversion for both monetary treatments shift to the right in wave 2 compared to wave 1, but the apparent increase in risk aversion is not statistically significant, as noted above. 34 The marginal effect of the high stakes treatment on the estimated population mean is positive and the population distribution shifts to the right in both waves. The estimated coefficient of the high stakes treatment is equal to 0.088 with a p-value of 0.017 in wave 1, and equal to 0.059 with a p-value of 0.260 in wave 2. We thus observe a significant effect of the high stakes treatment on relative risk aversion in wave 1 and an insignificant effect in wave 2.
We next consider temporal stability at the individual level. The estimated correlation coefficient between relative risk aversion in wave 1 and 2, ñ r1r2 , is equal to 0.360, which is significantly different from 33 Since the mean of the r parameter has been conditioned on two treatment variables, in each wave there are 3 estimates associated with the mean (constant, RAfirst, RAhigh). Temporal stability of the population distribution therefore entails 4 between-wave equality restrictions, comprising 3 restrictions on the mean and 1 restriction on the standard deviation.
34 Figure 1 is generated from the point estimates of the population mean and population standard deviation of the relative risk aversion parameter. It does not reflect the standard errors around those point estimates, nor the covariance between them. Our statistical tests do take these into account.
-25-
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 0 (p-value < 0.001). The significant positive correlation suggests that risk preferences are temporally stable at the individual level, in the sense that someone with an above-average r parameter in wave 1 also tends to have an above-average r parameter in wave 2, and thus we reject the hypothesis that the two population distributions are independent.
Turning to the results for RDU, reported in detail in Table C2 of Appendix C, we draw mixed conclusions that depend on which aspect of temporal stability that one is interested in. Under RDU risk preferences are characterized by the r parameter as well as the weighting parameter, ö, which is lognormally distributed. The entire population distribution of risk preferences may be said to be stable when the joint distribution of r and ö is stable. More formally, this joint hypothesis requires stability in the estimated population means of the r and ö parameters, the estimated population standard deviations of r and ö, and the estimated correlation between r and ö. We cannot reject this type of temporal stability; the associated ÷ 2 (9) test statistic has a p-value of 0.303. bias, and we observe that the estimated population means of the r parameter are almost identical across the two waves. The estimated between-wave difference in the population mean is 0.031 for the low stake treatment and 0.022 for the high stake treatment, and neither estimate is statistically significant. We also observe that the population distributions in wave 2 have a smaller standard deviation than the distributions in wave 1; the estimated standard deviation is 0.955 in wave 1 and 0.763 in wave 2, and we reject the null hypothesis that the estimated difference in the two coefficients is equal to 0 at the 5% significance level (p-value of 0.042). Hence, we find temporal stability with respect to population mean and 35 The stable marginal distribution of the r parameter entails 4 restrictions. Similarly, the stable marginal distribution of the ö parameter entails another set of 4 restrictions. In total, temporal stability in the joint distribution of r and ö parameters entails 9 between-wave equality restrictions: 8 restrictions on the marginal distributions and 1 restriction on the correlation coefficient between the two parameters.
-26-
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology temporal instability with respect to the standard deviation of the r parameter. The estimated correlation coefficient between the population distributions of the r parameter over time, ñ r1r2 , is equal to 0.689, which is somewhat higher than the estimated coefficient under EUT, and we reject the hypothesis that the two population distributions are independent.
The estimated population distributions of the probability weighting parameter ö are displayed in Figure 2b . The distributions in the upper panel control for selection and attrition bias, and we observe insignificant differences in the estimated population distributions of the ö parameter between the two waves. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the population distribution of the ö parameter is temporally stable; the ÷ 2 (4) test statistic has a p-value of 0.306. The estimated difference in the population mean between the two waves is statistically insignificant across each monetary treatment, and we also find that the standard deviation of the population distribution is temporally stable. The estimated standard deviation is higher in wave 2 compared to wave 1, but the estimated difference in the standard deviation is statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.326). Finally, we find that the estimated between-wave correlation of the ö parameter is 0.662 with a standard error of 0.159, which suggests that there is a strong degree of temporal stability at the individual level.
In summary, we contribute to the literature by modeling risk preferences in a non-linear, structural manner, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity across the population and endogenous selection and attrition. The use of panel correlations in structural parameters to test individual-level stability is also a unique feature of our analysis. The ability to analyze temporal stability at both the population and individual level in a single econometric model demonstrates the coherency and flexibility of our econometric modeling approach. Appendix D reviews related previous literature.
B. Effects of Sample Selection and Attrition on Risk Attitudes under EUT
We observe significant evidence of exogenous and endogenous selection and attrition effects on the estimated coefficients reported in Table C1 . We find a positive and significant effect of the higher recruitment fee on the propensity to self-select into the first wave of our experiment. In effect, the law of demand applies to participation in the experiments, and response rates increase significantly when the -27-
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology recruitment fee is raised from 300 kroner to 500 kroner for participation in wave 1. We also find a statistically significant and U-shaped association between the self-selection index and the home-to-hotel distance, suggesting that there is a negative and diminishing marginal effect of the distance up to a turning point at 34.22 miles. In other words, as one may expect, people who live farther away from the session venues are less likely to participate, and people who live closer are more sensitive to a small increase in the distance. Of course the sign of the marginal effect changes after the turning point, but this is more or less an artefact of the quadratic specification that is of limited economic significance, since only six out of the 1996 invitees lived outside a 34.22-mile radius from a venue. 36 Looking at observable characteristics, middle aged and older subjects are more likely to select into the first wave compared to omitted age group. It is generally difficult to explain panel retention rates in terms of observed characteristics, although the results do suggest that young and high-income subjects are less likely to select into the second wave than otherwise.
Turning to endogenous effects of sample selection and attrition, we find enough statistical evidence to reject the hypothesis of no selection and attrition bias, respectively. The hypothesis of no endogenous sample selection bias is evaluated using the joint test of H 0 : ñ s1s2 = ñ s1r1 = ñ s1r2 = 0. This hypothesis is rejected, with a p-value less than 0.001. The hypothesis of no endogenous attrition bias can be tested by H 0 : ñ s2r1 = ñ s2r2 = 0, which again is rejected, with a p-value less than 0.001. The estimated correlation coefficient between the error terms in the selection and attrition equations, ñ s1s2 , is equal to -0.340 with a standard error of 0.125, which means that one cannot take the naïve approach of correcting for each source of sampling bias separately.
We can see the overall effects of controlling for selection and attrition bias on the estimated population distributions of relative risk aversion in Figure 1 . The lower panel shows the estimated distributions with no correction for sample selection and attrition bias. Despite the significant statistical 36 All but one of the 1996 invitees lived within a 36.2-mile radius from a venue. The exceptional case was one subject that lived in Copenhagen but participated in the experiment in Århus.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology evidence of sample selection and attrition bias, we draw qualitatively similar conclusions about temporal stability. We observe that the population mean increases over time and the population distribution becomes tighter around the mean. 37 Although the estimated population mean is higher in wave 2 compared to wave 1 for both monetary treatments, there is statistically significant evidence of temporal stability with respect to relative risk aversion at the population level. We also find temporal stability at the individual level. The estimated correlation coefficient between relative risk aversion in wave 1 and 2 is equal to 0.537, which is significantly different from 0 (p-value < 0.001).
Correcting for endogenous attrition is often easier than correcting for endogenous selection, since in the case of attrition one potentially knows a lot about the subjects that did not attend later waves from their participation in the very first wave. It would then be possible to correct for attrition bias under the assumption of no selection bias, as in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008b] . When the maintained assumption fails, as in the present analysis, this may lead to a sharply different conclusion from the full approach that corrects for both types of biases. For example, only correcting for attrition bias would have led us to reject temporal stability in the population mean and standard deviation of relative risk aversion, with a p-value of 0.007.
38
We do not claim that correcting for attrition bias under the assumption of no selection bias is less desirable than making no correction at all. This is an empirical issue that must be evaluated on a case-bycase basis. 39 Characterizing situations in which endogenous selection has substantive effects is an 37 Table C3 in Appendix C reports the estimated parameters for the EUT model with no correction for selection and attrition bias.
38 Table C7 in Appendix C reports the estimated parameters for this EUT model with corrections for attrition bias and no corrections for selection bias. 39 Whether correcting for only one type of bias worsens the overall bias or not depends on the interplay of all correlation coefficients pertaining to selection and attrition errors (in our case, ñ s1s2 , ñ s1r1 , ñ s1r2 , ñ s2r1 and ñ s2r2 ). There is no analytic formula, or even reliable intuition, that can provide a guide. This -29-
9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology inherently difficult task, since it is correlation in unobservables that drives selection bias. The constructive implication of our analysis is that one can identify the effects of selection directly by adopting an experimental design that exogenously varies show-up fees, and avoid speculating on the presence and magnitude of selection bias.
C. Effects of Sample Selection and Attrition on Risk Attitudes under RDU
We continue to observe significant selection and attrition bias under RDU. The hypothesis test of no sample selection bias now involves the correlation coefficients between the error term in the selection equation and the five other random components (the error term in the attrition equation, two r parameters, and two ö parameters). This hypothesis is rejected at all conventional levels, since the p-value is less than 0.001. The hypothesis test of no attrition bias involves the correlation coefficients between the error term in the attrition equation and four structural parameters (two r parameters, and two ö parameters) and we again reject the null hypothesis of no attrition bias (p-value < 0.001). The estimated correlation coefficient between the error terms in the selection and attrition equations, ñ s1s2 , is equal to -0.416 with a standard error of 0.162, so we can again reject the naïve approach of correcting for each source of sampling bias separately. Figure 2b displays the overall effects of controlling for selection and attrition bias on the estimated population distributions of the probability weighting parameter. The lower panel shows the estimated distributions with no correction for sample selection and attrition bias, and here we find statistical evidence of temporal stability. 40 More specifically, without corrections for non-random selection and attrition bias, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the population distribution of the ö parameter is temporally stable (the ÷ 2 (4) test statistic has a p-value of 0.304). Viewed another way, the uncorrected estimates of the probability weighting parameter seem relatively stable around biased base levels. We also issue may be best addressed by a Monte Carlo study of misspecification biases under systematically varied patterns of correlations. 40 The estimated parameters are reported in Table C4 in Appendix C.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology observe that the shape of the population distribution for the weighting parameter changes when we correct for selection and attrition bias. Figure 2b shows that the population distribution of the ö parameter is more skewed to the right in the upper panel with corrections compared to the lower panel without corrections. A larger fraction of subjects can be classified by an inverse-S shaped probability weighting function when we correct for selection and attrition bias compared to the non-corrected estimates.
We can look closer at the effect of adding controls for sample selection and attrition on risk attitudes under RDU. The effects on the mean of the r parameter are modest: estimates of concavity slightly decline in both wave 1 and wave 2 when we control for selection and attrition bias, so the risk premium derived from utility concavity, ceteris paribus, is lower. The effects on the mean of the ö parameter are shown in Figure 3a . The top (bottom) panel refers to the first (second) wave, and the left (right) panel refers to the low (high) stakes treatment. There are two outcomes in each lottery, and the probability weighting functions displayed in Figure 3a are identical to the implied decision weights on the highest outcome. Based on Figure 3a we can infer the effect of probability weighting on risk attitudes evaluated at the mean of ö. The S-shape of the probability weighting function leads to a negative (positive) risk premium for lotteries with a relatively high (low) probability of the highest outcome, ceteris paribus. We see similar S-shaped probability weighting across the two waves. While corrections for selection and attrition bias do not change our qualitative inferences regarding the shapes of the probability weighting functions, they lead to smaller mean estimates in both waves making the extent of probability distortion less pronounced. This finding on S-shaped probability weighting at mean values does not contradict the upper panel of Figure 2b that classifies a large fraction of the population as inverse-S instead: ö follows a rightskewed distribution, and the mean is sensitive to a long right tail.
We can again assess the potential error in assuming away selection bias and just correcting for attrition bias. As with EUT, this "second best" approach again leads to incorrect inferences. 41 Under RDU 41 Table C8 in Appendix C reports the estimated parameters for the RDU model with corrections for attrition bias and no corrections for selection bias.
-31- We can derive certainty equivalents for each lottery in Option A and Option B of the 40 decision tasks, and then evaluate the risk premia associated with different prize sets. Figure 3b Heckman and Smith [1995; p.99] noted that, "Surprisingly, little is known about the empirical importance of randomization bias." Aggregate data on participation rates from job training experiments by Hotz [1992] and clinical trials by Kramer and Shapiro [1984] suggest that the bias due to endogenous participation decisions might be significant, but we know of no study that directly evaluates the hypothesis. 43 We do not a priori know the direction of randomization bias in economics experiments, and 42 Under EUT (RDU) the instability comes from the estimated mean (standard deviation) of the population parameter r. We obtain similar aggregate results for temporal stability under RDU, but with one difference.
Conclusions
Under RDU the risk premium depends on utility curvature and probability weighting. When we consider the joint distribution of all parameters characterizing utility curvature and probability weighting, we cannot reject the hypothesis of temporal stability. This is what one would expect from the EUT results, since the two must agree in terms of the aggregate risk premium. But we find that there is temporal stability of the mean of the utility curvature parameter and temporal instability of the standard deviation of the utility curvature parameter. The parameter characterizing probability weighting demonstrates temporal stability. We again observe correlations between parameters over time, consistent with individual-level temporal stability.
Kenward [2005] compare the effects of obvious ad hoc methods (such as assuming that the last observed case for some subject who does not participate in later sessions is the observation that the subject would have provided, or only using sub-samples that participate in all sessions), methods based on imputation and corrections for the imprecision of the imputation, and "direct-likelihood" methods such as those used
here.
-33- These results are encouraging, in the sense that temporal stability allows policy-makers to have some sense of confidence when designing policies that affect risky outcomes over time, such as social insurance. But the results are particularly striking because we also find statistically significant evidence of endogenous sample selection and attrition. One might find temporal stability without making a correction for selection and attrition because the "raw data" is literally the same from wave to wave, or even the inferred risk preferences are literally the same from wave to wave. We conclude that one must make that correction, and that it results in changes in the averages and standard deviations of risk preference parameters:
compare the top and bottom panels of Figure 1 under EUT and Figure 2a under RDU, and the two sets of probability weights in each panel in Figure 2b under RDU. These changes in risk preferences translate into economically significant changes in risk premia, as shown in Figure 3b . Although we find evidence consistent with temporal stability with no corrections for selection and attrition, this is temporal stability with respect to biased estimates of risk preferences.
The effects of selection and attrition also accord with intuition. For example, we find a positive and significant effect of the higher recruitment fee on the propensity to self-select into the first wave of our experiment. And people who live farther away from the session venues are less likely to participate, and people who live closer are more sensitive to a small increase in the distance.
Our results therefore show that randomization bias can have significant effects on inferences about risk attitudes. Neglecting endogenous sample selection and attrition could lead one to draw erroneous conclusions about risk attitudes at a point in time (e.g. the average Dane's relative risk aversion now), as well as stability in risk attitudes over time (e.g. whether the average Dane's relative risk aversion has changed over time). In fact, we find that neglecting selection and attrition leads to the first type of erroneous conclusion but not, in general, to the second type of erroneous conclusion. These results hold whether one uses an EUT or RDU characterization of risk attitudes, although the way in which sample selection and attrition affects the analysis is different across the two decision theories as well as alternative measures of temporal stability that one may consider.
-34- These effects of randomization bias on risk attitudes are clear in our design because of the exogenous variation in recruitment fees. We do not claim that our findings generalize beyond the adult Danish population, the specific recruitment fees we employed, or the battery of lotteries we employed. On the other hand, our sample is wide and representative of the adult Danish population, and our recruitment fees and lottery parameters fall well within common practice in field experiments. The constructive implication for future experimental design is to exogenously vary show-up fees and evaluate the effects on a case-by-case basis. Access to administrative data such as the Danish Civil Registry is not a prerequisite for operationalizing the proposed design. Recruiting experimental subjects from an existing household survey sample (e.g., Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen [2010] ) is an example of an alternative study design that allows one to obtain background information on non-participants. Of course, in the latter case, correcting for the effects of selection would lead to inferences that pertain to a survey population instead of a general population.
The need for corrections to mitigate randomization bias is "bad news" from our results, because it requires renewed attention to ex ante sample design and/or ex post statistical corrections. It also raises deep concerns with experimental designs that rely on randomization to infer causal effects, and that only check for consistency of observables over time. However, the "good news" is that even after making such corrections there are still many quantitative and qualitative aspects of risk attitudes that remain temporally stable, at least for this population and the time frame evaluated in our experiments.
Why is it that we observe such stability of risk preferences in Denmark, during a period in which all major industrialized countries experienced various macroeconomic disruptions? One hypothesis might be that the extensive social network of consumer protections in Denmark mitigated the effect of changes in these "background risks" on the "foreground" risk aversion our experiments measured. There is also evidence that Danes view the foreground risks of experiments as distinct from their extra-experimental wealth (Andersen, Cox, Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sadiraj [2018] ). The methodology we develop can be applied to different populations, to evaluate the extent to which they exhibit the same temporal stability of risk preferences.
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